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Quantum key distribution (QKD) utilizes the laws of quantum mechanics to achieve information-theoretically
secure key generation. This field is now approaching the stage of commercialization, but many practical QKD
systems still suffer from security loopholes due to imperfect devices. In fact, practical attacks have successfully
been demonstrated. Fortunately, most of them only exploit detection-side loopholes, which are now closed by the
recent idea of measurement-device-independent QKD. On the other hand, little attention is paid to the source,
which may still leave QKD systems insecure. In this work, we propose and demonstrate an attack that exploits a
source-side loophole existing in qubit-based QKD systems using a weak coherent state source and decoy states.
Specifically, by implementing a linear-optics unambiguous state discrimination measurement, we show that the
security of a system without phase randomization—which is a step assumed in conventional security analyses but
sometimes neglected in practice—can be compromised. We conclude that implementing phase randomization is
essential to the security of decoy-state QKD systems under current security analyses.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.88.022308 PACS number(s): 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Ac, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.−p
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) aims at offering
information-theoretical security for secret key expansion [1,2]
that is guaranteed by quantum mechanics. Commercial QKD
systems have emerged on the market and are now under
rapid development. Despite theoretical security proofs, various
quantum hacking strategies targeting practical QKD systems
have been proposed, with some of them demonstrated in
experiments. These attacks exploit certain imperfections in
the devices used to build QKD systems. Except for the
phase-remapping attack [3,4], which aims at the source of
plug-and-play QKD systems, until now, most practical attacks
have been launched on the detection side of QKD systems,
including the fake-state attack [5,6], the time-shift attack [7,8],
and the detector-blinding attack [9,10].
In order to achieve security when imperfect (untrusted)
devices are present, QKD schemes [11,12] that are fully device
independent (without assumptions on either the detector or the
source) have been proposed. However, these schemes suffer
from their unrealistic requirement for a high transmission
efficiency (with the lowest to date being 75% [13]), which
limits their use in practice. Recently, the newly proposed
measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) scheme
[14], whose security does not rely on any assumptions on
the detection system, can defeat all aforementioned detection-
side attacks. On the source side, the security proof of
the MDI-QKD scheme relies on a trusted-source scenario,
whose security concern is relatively less explored. Besides,
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many other security proofs [15,16] also rely on stringent
assumptions on the source side. Any deviation from these
assumptions may lead to loopholes that can be exploited for
eavesdropping.
The use of different sources directly affects the security
of QKD systems. Systems implementing the popular Bennett-
Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [1] often use a weak coherent
state (WCS) source instead of a single-photon source for the
transmission of quantum states. Fortunately, such a substitu-
tion of the source is safe but its security proof [15,17] assumes
that the phase of the source is randomized, without which the
security would be weakened [18]. Later security proof by Lo
and Preskill [16] eliminated the need for phase randomization,
but with the performance substantially diminished.
Even though the security of the BB84 protocol with WCS is
proven, there is a substantial performance gap between it and
the case of a single-photon source. A significant achievement
was made with the proposal of the decoy-state technique
[15,19,20], which greatly improves the performance of the
BB84 protocol with WCS, and thus decoy-state BB84 with
WCS has become one of the most popular schemes for prac-
tical implementation. Again, phase randomization is assumed
in the current security proof [15], and a security analysis
for decoy-state QKD without phase randomization is not yet
available [16]. This fact can easily be overlooked and QKD
system designers often neglect the implementation of phase
randomization without realizing the danger of opening up a
security loophole. Indeed, we experimentally demonstrate that
this is a major security loophole. We propose and demonstrate
an attack on the source part of a decoy-state QKD system
with WCS when phase randomization is not implemented. By
using a combination of an unambiguous-state-discrimination
(USD) measurement and a photon-number-splitting (PNS)
attack [21], we show that the final key generated by the
non-phase-randomized system can be compromised.
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II. HACKING STRATEGY
The essence of our hacking strategy is as follows. Since
Alice prepares her pulses without phase randomization, we
may assume that Eve knows the overall phase of every
transmitted state by Alice in the worst-case scenario. Then,
from Eve’s point of view, the states sent by Alice are drawn
from an ensemble of pure states (corresponding to the signal
and decoy states). Thus, quantum mechanics allows Eve to
distinguish between the signal and decoy states by a USD
measurement. In this way, one of the foundations of the
security proof of decoy-state QKD, the photon number channel
model [15], is violated.
Eve’s attack is composed of two parts, a USD measurement
and a PNS attack strategy [21], as shown in Fig. 1. First, Eve
performs a positive operator-valued measurement (POVM) to
distinguish between a signal state and a decoy state without
disturbing the quantum state sent by Alice (see Appendix A for
details). Then she measures the photon number. Conditioned
on her measurement results for the signal/decoy information,
Eve may forward some photons to Bob so as to preserve the
statistics of a normal quantum channel. For a single-photon
state, Eve either blocks it or directly forwards it without
knowing the qubit information, while for a multiphoton state,
Eve can keep one copy and forward the rest, giving her the full
qubit information (see Appendix B for details).
An attack is considered successful if Eve is able to trick
Alice and Bob into accepting an insecure key. To show that our
attack is successful, we compare the following two key rates:
(i) a lower bound on the secure key rate from the perspective
of Alice and Bob, who overlook phase randomization and
apply the conventional decoy-state postprocessing, denoted
Rl , and (ii) an upper bound on the secure key rate taking into
account our attack, denoted Ru. The former situation assumes
that phase randomization is performed (but is actually not
performed) and uses the postprocessing scheme presented in
Ref. [22]; the key rate lower bound for this case (details given
in Appendix E) is
Rl = −QμH (Eμ) + Y s1 μe−μ
[
1 − H (es1)], (1)
where Qμ and Eμ are the overall gain and quantum
bit error rate (QBER); μ denotes the expected photon
number of the signal state; Y s1 and es1 are the yield and the
error rate of the single-photon signal state, respectively,
FIG. 1. (Color online) Schematic diagram of the USD + PNS
attack on a decoy-state QKD system without phase randomization.
Eve intercepts the quantum states sent by Alice and then performs a
USD measurement to distinguish the signal/decoy state succeeded by
a PNS attack. Conditioned on her results of signal/decoy information
and photon numbers, she sets the yields smartly so that the detection
statistics on Bob’s side remains the same as the case without attacks.
which are estimated by the decoy-state method; and
H (e) = −e log2(e) − (1 − e) log2(1 − e) is the binary
Shannon entropy function. Here, we assume that Alice and
Bob run the efficient BB84 [23] and take the basis sift factor
to be 1. On the other hand, our USD + PNS attack sets an
upper bound on the key rate (details given in Appendix C):
Ru = Y s1 e−μμ. (2)
Note that different values of Y s1 are used in the computation
of Rl and Ru. The value of Y s1 used in the lower bound, Rl ,
is the one estimated by Alice and Bob using conventional
decoy-state processing, and the value used in the upper bound,
Ru, is the one chosen by Eve in the attack. Since the lower
bound represents the key rate at which Alice and Bob generate
a new key that they think is secure, if this rate is higher than
what is allowed after taking into account our attack, some of
the new key must be insecure and Eve has some information
about it. Thus, our attack is successful if
Rl > Ru (attack successful). (3)
Eve’s attack aims to preserve the measurement statistics
of Bob in order to conceal the attack. We form the attack
strategy as an optimization problem subject to preserving the
gain statistics. On the other hand, we do not constrain the
error statistics here since the error rate introduced by our
attack demonstration is negligible. To get more details of this
discussion, please see Appendix F.
III. EXPERIMENT SETUP
The PNS attack of our USD + PNS hacking strategy, which
requires a quantum nondemolition measurement [24–27] on
the photon numbers, a lossless channel, and the ability to
control Bob’s detector efficiency, is beyond current technology.
Thus, we assume in the analysis that Eve has the ability
to perform the PNS part and we only realize the USD
measurement in our experiment.
To demonstrate the attack, we use a phase-encoding BB84
QKD system with strong phase-stabilization pulses [28–30].
The experimental setup is shown in Fig. 2. At Alice’s site, a
distributed feedback (DFB) diode with a central wavelength
of 1550.12 nm and a pulse duration of 1 ns operates at a
repetition rate of 4 MHz. Then the laser pulse passes through
two asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometers (AMZIs). The
first one splits the coherent pulse generated by the laser source
into two time bins, one for the phase stabilization and the other
for the quantum signal. Then, the decoy state is prepared by
randomly modulating the intensity of the quantum signal. The
intensities of the signal and decoy states, μ and ν, are set to 0.5
and 0.1, respectively. In the second AMZI, the phase modulator
encodes the quantum pulse with one of the four BB84 phases,
and it performs no action on the strong phase-stabilization
pulse.
At Eve’s site, both the phase-stabilization pulse and the
quantum signal are split into two pulses with a 99:1 beam
splitter of Eve’s AMZI, which have the same splitting ratio
and the same path-length difference as Alice’s first AMZI. The
fraction of the phase-stabilization light, passing through the
arm with the intensity modulator, interferes with the fraction
of the quantum signal, passing through the arm with the
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Schematic of our experiment setup for USD measurement demonstration. Alice’s first AMZI splits the signal pulse
into two pulses: a strong one for phase stabilization and a weak one for the quantum signal modulated by the intensity modulator (IM) to be
either a decoy state or a signal state. The second AMZI encodes the BB84 states with a phase modulator (PM). Then a synchronization pulse
is coupled with the signal pulses into a signal fiber and sent to Bob. At Eve’s site, she utilizes a polarization controller and polarizer (Pol) to
compensate for the polarization change and a phase shifter (PS) to compensate for the phase drift. Then she uses the same AMZI setup as
Alice’s first one to make the quantum pulse interfere with the strong phase-stabilization pulse modulated by the IM. The interference result
either indicates the identity of the quantum pulse (signal or decoy) or is inconclusive.
phase shifter. With the intensity modulator, Eve can choose
to measure either the signal or the decoy state. Eve’s AMZI
cancels the path delay between the phase-stabilization pulse
and the quantum signal pulse, which is set by Alice’s first
AMZI, and makes the two pulses meet and interfere with each
other. Identical AMZIs will make perfect interference, and in
our experiment, we have achieved a high visibility of 500:1.
The interference results can be divided into two cases: (i) if
the pulses in the two arms have the same intensity, detector D2
does not click and the USD measurement result is inconclusive;
and (ii) when detector D2 clicks, Eve can identify the state sent
by Alice. The second case corresponds to a successful USD
measurement outcome for Eve.
IV. RESULTS
The performance of our USD experiment is characterized
by two sets of parameters, as listed in Table I. The first one is
related to success probabilities. Since the overlap between the
signal and decoy states is nonzero, Eve’s USD measurement
cannot succeed with unity probability and we denote the
success probability when Alice sends a signal (decoy) state
by qμ (qν). The second set of parameters is related to error
probabilities. Note that even when the USD measurement
succeeds, experimental imperfection may cause the USD to
report the wrong state. We denote the probability of correctly
identifying the input state conditioned on a successful USD by
ξμ (ξν) when Alice sends the signal (decoy) state. These key
parameters qμ, qν , ξμ, and ξν characterize the effectiveness
of our USD attack from Eve’s perspective and her ability to
compromise the security of the QKD system. Details of these
definitions can be found in Appendix C.
Several aspects of our experiment affect the success proba-
bilities qμ and qν . First is the fundamental indistinguishability
of nonorthogonal quantum states. Our USD measurement
acts only on the first pulse, and not on the second pulse,
which encodes the phase information. The optimal USD
to distinguish the two possibilities of the first pulse, |√μ2 〉
and |√ ν2 〉, has maximal success probability (details given in
Appendix A)
qopt = 1 − exp
(− 14 |√ν − √μ|2). (4)
On the other hand, our linear-optics USD setup, shown in
Fig. 2, achieves only qmax = qopt/2 even when the devices
are perfect. It is an interesting question with regard to how
to implement a USD measurement to achieve qopt, especially
with linear optics. When μ = 0.5 and ν = 0.1, one obtains
qmax = 1.87% and qopt = 3.75%. Experimental imperfections
and inefficient detectors further reduce the actual success
probability.
The measurement results for qμ, qν , ξμ, and ξν over a time
period of 748 s are listed in Table II. Note that ξμ (ξν) is near
100%, which indicates that we almost never made a mistake
in identifying the state.
TABLE I. Ideal and experimental probabilities of the USD attack, conditioned on signal/decoy
states sent by Alice.
State of Ideal case Experimental case
Alice Signal Decoy Failure Signal Decoy Failure
Signal qmax 0 1 − qmax qμξμ qμ(1 − ξμ) 1 − qμ
Decoy 0 qmax 1 − qmax qν(1 − ξν) qνξν 1 − qν
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TABLE II. Experimental results. The standard deviations (in the
time domain) of qμ, qν , ξμ, and ξν are, respectively, 4.3 × 10−5,
4.0 × 10−5, 0.98%, and 0.40%, which shows that the attack system
is robust.
qμ qν ξμ ξν qopt
1.18 × 10−3 1.16 × 10−3 96.90% 98.37% 3.75%
Using the experimental values for these parameters, we
can derive the key rate upper bound as a function of the
transmission loss between Alice and Bob, which is shown in
Fig. 3. Also shown is the the lower bound of the key rate that
Alice and Bob thought to be achievable with the assumption of
phase randomization, which adopts some realistic parameters
of Bob’s setup with superconducting single-photon detectors
[31]: dark count Y0 = 10−7, detection efficiency 5%, and
misalignment error rate ed = 2.0%. The key result is that when
the overall transmission loss is beyond 36.3 dB, the upper
bound is below the lower bound as shown in Eq. (3), and thus
our attack allows Eve to successfully steal the secret key.
To illustrate the potential power of the ideal USD + PNS
attack, we consider the ideal USD measurement and take the
success probabilities qμ and qν to be the theoretically maxi-
mum of 3.75% and the correct distinguishing probabilities, ξμ
and ξν , to be 1. This upper bound curve is shown in Fig. 3,
which indicates that when the overall loss between Alice and
Bob is only beyond 21.2 dB, the decoy-state BB84 protocol
with phase-nonrandomized WCS is insecure. For comparison,
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Bounds on the key generation rate. The
lower bound, given in Eq. (1), is computed by ignoring the phase
randomization problem. The simulated upper bound is evaluated by
Eq. (2) and the data listed in Table II. The region for which the
upper bound is below the lower bound corresponds to the secret
key being stolen by Eve. Also shown are two best theoretical upper
bounds using ideal values qμ = qν = 23.0%,3.75% and ξμ = ξν = 1,
where the dash-dotted (dashed) curve corresponds to a setup with
a relative phase of π (0) between signal and decoy pulses giving
rise to qμ = qν = 23.0% (3.75%). Upper bounds corresponding to
other relative phases fall between these two curves. Note that in our
experiment, the relative phase is 0. Our attack is successful when the
lower bound is higher than the upper bound, which occurs when the
transmission loss is larger than 36.3 dB (for our experiment), 21.2 dB
(for the ideal situation with zero relative phase), and 13.3 dB (for the
ideal situation with π relative phase).
an upper bound curve for the success probability of 23.0%
corresponding to the relative phase between signal and decoy
pulses of π is also shown. In essence, this figure shows that
the potential impact of our attack can be significant and phase
randomization cannot be neglected in decoy-state QKD.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
By exploiting the phase information of the signal and
decoy states, our experimental attack succeeds in stealing
the final secret key when the transmission loss is over a
certain threshold. We prove that phase randomization cannot
be neglected in decoy-state QKD using WCS, unless a
new security proof is available. Our result also answers
a long-standing question. Before our work, it was unclear
whether performing phase randomization improves the key
rate performance of decoy-state BB84 using a WCS. Our result
implies that performing phase randomization is strictly better.
We remark that our attack is not limited to the phase-encoding
system with strong phase-stabilization pulses [28–30] on
which our experiment is based. As long as the phase of each
state, be it a signal or a decoy state, is known by Eve, she
does not need the strong phase reference from Alice. Eve
can simply prepare an auxiliary pulse with the corresponding
phase. Therefore, this attack can be launched to hack a regular
decoy-state QKD system without phase randomization.
A key feature of our experiment is the implementation
of USD with linear optics. Even with only linear optics,
this attack system can efficiently compromise the security of
the key. Our work on applying USD with linear optics in
quantum information opens an avenue to full linear-optics-
based implementation of general quantum measurements,
extending previous results [32–34]. For future work, it is an
interesting perspective topic to study the case where Eve knows
partial information on the phases. For example, in a QKD
system with active phase randomization [35], the phase may
not be perfectly random in practice. A related question will be
whether a fully randomized phase is necessary for Alice and
Bob to guarantee the security.
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APPENDIX A: USD MEASUREMENT
Considering the one-decoy state protocol [22], where two
coherent states are used by Alice, a signal state, |√μeiθs 〉, and
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a weak decoy state, |√νeiθd 〉. Here, μ and ν are the intensities
of the signal and decoy states, respectively, with μ > ν; θs and
θd are the phases of the signal and decoy states, respectively.
Since no phase randomization is performed and Alice does
not intentionally put any phase difference between signal and
decoy pulses, their phases are naturally the same and thus we
take θs = θd = 0. (For the case where θs − θd = 0, the success
probability for Eve’s attack will increase as shown in Fig. 3.)
For the phase-encoding scheme, Alice encodes qubits in
the relative phases of the two pulses separated by the second
Mach-Zehnder interferometer, as shown in Fig. 2. For the
BB84 protocol, she encodes φ ∈ {0,π/2,π,3π/2} randomly
and sends out
|ψs〉 =
∣∣∣∣
√
μ
2
〉∣∣∣∣eiφ
√
μ
2
〉
,
(A1)
|ψd〉 =
∣∣∣∣
√
ν
2
〉∣∣∣∣eiφ
√
ν
2
〉
for signal and decoy states, respectively.
Since the signal and decoy states are not orthogonal (i.e.,
〈ψs |ψd〉 = 0), Eve cannot perfectly distinguish them with
unity probability. Instead, she performs a USD measurement
to perfectly distinguish them with probability <1. We impose
that our USD measurement acts only on the first pulse and we
leave the second pulse, which encodes the phase information,
intact. This is because a measurement on the second pulse may
destroy the qubit encoded in the relative phase. In this case, the
failure probability corresponding to the optimal USD [36–38]
(assuming equal a prior probabilities of |ψs〉 and |ψd〉, which
is the case in our experiment) is given by the overlap between
the states to be identified:
pf =
∣∣∣∣
〈√
ν
2
∣∣∣∣
√
μ
2
〉∣∣∣∣ = exp
(
−1
2
∣∣∣∣
√
ν
2
−
√
μ
2
∣∣∣∣
2)
. (A2)
The corresponding POVM is
ˆEμ = 1(1 + pf )
(
1 − p2f
)P(∣∣∣∣
√
μ
2
〉
−
〈√
ν
2
∣∣∣∣
√
μ
2
〉∣∣∣∣
√
ν
2
〉)
,
ˆEν = 1(1 + pf )
(
1 − p2f
)P(∣∣∣∣
√
ν
2
〉
−
〈√
μ
2
∣∣∣∣
√
ν
2
〉∣∣∣∣
√
μ
2
〉)
,
ˆEf = I − ˆEμ − ˆEν, (A3)
where we define the projection function P (|ϕ〉) = |ϕ〉〈ϕ| for
some state |ϕ〉. The measurement outcome ˆEα indicates that
the input state is |√α/2〉, where α = μ,ν; and the outcome ˆEf
is inconclusive about whether the input state is a signal state or
a decoy state. Note that the success probability corresponding
to the optimal USD is
qopt 
〈√
μ
2
∣∣∣∣ ˆEμ
∣∣∣∣
√
μ
2
〉
=
〈√
ν
2
∣∣∣∣ ˆEν
∣∣∣∣
√
ν
2
〉
= 1 − pf , (A4)
and error does not occur since 〈√μ/2| ˆEν |
√
μ/2〉 =
〈√ν/2| ˆEμ|
√
ν/2〉 = 0. The ideal probabilities of this optimal
USD measurement outcomes are summarized in Table I. In our
experiment, we implement the USD measurement with linear
optics as shown in Fig. 2, and its maximal success probability,
assuming 100% efficiency detectors, is given by
qmax =
1 − ∣∣〈0∣∣√μ4 −√ ν4 〉∣∣2
2
= 1 − exp
(−|√μ−√ν|24 )
2
= qopt
2
. (A5)
It is an interesting question to find a way to implement the
optimal USD measurement corresponding to Eq. (A3) using
linear optics.
APPENDIX B: PNS ATTACK
After the USD measurement, Eve measures the photon
number of Alice’s pulse and launches the PNS attack.
The photon numbers of the two WCSs follow the Poisson
distribution:
P si =
μie−μ
i!
, P di =
νie−ν
i!
. (B1)
Define the gains, Qμ and Qν , respectively, to be the probabil-
ities for Bob to get a detection event given that Alice sends
signal and decoy states,
Qμ = Y s0 P s0 + Y s1 P s1 + Y s2 P s2 + · · · , (B2)
Qν = Y d0 P d0 + Y d1 P d1 + Y d2 P d2 + · · · .
where Yi is the yield of the i-photon state or the conditional
probability for Bob to get a detection given that Alice sends
out an i-photon state; the superscripts, s and d, denote the
signal state and decoy state, respectively.
In the postprocessing of decoy-state QKD, the yield of
the single-photon-state component can be inferred from the
detection statistics of signal and decoy states on Bob’s side.
The underlying assumption of the photon number channel
model for the security proof of decoy-state QKD [15] can
be described as
Y si = Y di , (B3)
which holds when the phases of signal and decoy states are
randomized. In our USD + PNS attack, Eq. (B3) is violated
when Eve is able to distinguish between the signal and decoy
states by a USD measurement given the phase information
of the coherent states. (Note that Eq. (B3) may also be
violated even when only partial phase information is known
to Eve [39].) She smartly chooses these proportions (Y si and
Y di ) so that her attack will not be detected. This is achieved by
maintaining the same observed gain statistics (Qμ and Qν) as
in the normal situation.
APPENDIX C: KEY RATE UPPER BOUND
In the USD attack, Eve performs the POVM as shown in
Fig. 2. Conditioned on these results, Eve sets a different yield
(detection probability) for each i-photon state. Define qμ (qν)
to be the conditional probability for Eve to result in a successful
measurement outcome when Alice sends out a signal (decoy)
state. Both experimental success probabilities, qμ and qν , are
limited by the theoretical maximum,
qμ,qν  qmax, (C1)
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TABLE III. Probabilities of these POVM outcomes, conditioned
on different intensity states sent by Alice, and yields for different
POVM outcomes and photon numbers i.
POVM Eμ Eν Ef
Signal qμξμ qμ(1 − ξμ) 1 − qμ
Decoy qν(1 − ξν) qνξν 1 − qν
Yields Zμi Zνi Xi
where qmax given in Eq. (A5) can be achieved when Eve’s
detection efficiency is 100%.
In practice, even when Eve obtains a successful measure-
ment outcome, she might make an error in determining whether
the state is a signal or a decoy state. Define
ξμ  Prob(Eμ|signal), ξν  Prob(Eν |decoy) (C2)
to be the conditional probabilities for Eve to guess Alice’s state
correctly when Eve obtains successful measurement outcome
and Alice sends out a signal (decoy) state. The relationship
between these probabilities when Alice sends out a signal and
decoy state is shown in Table III. This table appears as part of
Table I, which also shows the ideal probabilities of the optimal
USD measurement.
Define Zμi , Zνi , and Xi to be the yields of the i-photon state,
conditioned on Eve getting the measurement outcome Eμ, Eν ,
and Ef , respectively, as listed in the last row in Table III.
The yield is the probability that a valid detection occurs when
Eve sends a pulse to Bob after the attack. We assume that Eve
sets Zμ0 , Z
ν
0 , and X0 to 0. This is because if Eve forwards any
photon to Bob when she gets a vacuum state, she may introduce
errors. The quantum no-cloning theorem tells us that when the
photon number is 1, Eve is unable to keep a copy of the qubit
information, then the yields Zμi , Zνi , and Xi will enable Bob to
generate secure keys from this one-photon state component.
In our attack, we set Xi = 0 for all i, for the following
reason. Since our implementation of the USD measurement
destroys the quantum reference pulse, if the USD outcome is
inconclusive (i.e., Ef ), Eve cannot always choose the right
intensity for the regenerated reference pulse. This increases
the error rate for Bob, which alerts Alice and Bob to Eve’s
presence. Thus, in order to avoid this, we design Eve’s attack
so that when she fails to learn the state intensity, she does
not forward any pulse to Bob in order to emulate a channel
loss. This means that Xi = 0 for all i, which we assume for
the remaining analysis. Note that if a nondemolition method
is used to identify the intensity, no additional errors are
introduced and thus there is no need to set Xμi = Xνi = 0 for
all i.
Thus, the yields Y si and Y di , from Bob’s point of view, are
composed of the two successful outcomes of Eve as listed in
Table III:
Y si = qμ
[
ξμZ
μ
i + (1 − ξμ)Zνi
]
,
(C3)
Y di = qν
[
ξνZ
ν
i + (1 − ξν)Zμi
]
.
Then, by inserting Eq. (C3) into Eq. (B2), the gains of signal
and decoy states are given by
Qμ =
∞∑
i=1
qμ
[
ξμZ
μ
i + (1 − ξμ)Zνi
]
e−μ
μi
i!
,
(C4)
Qν =
∞∑
i=1
qν
[
ξνZ
ν
i + (1 − ξν)Zμi
]
e−ν
νi
i!
.
For a normal quantum channel, Alice and Bob should get
Qμ = 1 − e−ημ, Qν = 1 − e−ην. (C5)
If Eve does not want to disturb the detection statistics on Bob’s
side, she should choose Zμi and Zνi smartly, so that Eqs. (C4)
and (C5) are satisfied.
In the decoy-state postprocessing [22], the secure key is
only derived from the single-photon component. Then, the
upper bound of the key rate is given by [40]
Ru = Y s1 e−μμ = qμ
[
ξμZ
μ
1 + (1 − ξμ)Zν1
]
e−μμ. (C6)
Now, Eve needs to optimize Zμi and Zνi in order to minimize
the upper bound of the key rate, Eq. (C6). The optimization
problem can be stated as follows:
min
{Zμi , Zνi }
Y s1 (C7)
subject to
Qμ = 1 − e−ημ =
∞∑
i=1
qμ
[
ξμZ
μ
i + (1 − ξμ)Zνi
]
e−μ
μi
i!
,
Qν = 1 − e−ην =
∞∑
i=1
qν
[
ξνZ
ν
i + (1 − ξν)Zμi
]
e−ν
νi
i!
,
(C8)
where all Zμi and Zνi are in the regime [0,1]. In the detection
statistics equations, μ and ν are given by Alice’s intensity
choice, and qμ, qν are determined both by the overlap between
the signal and decoy states and by Eve’s USD measurement
efficiency. For a given overall efficiency η between Alice and
Bob, we can calculate the key rate upper bound.
APPENDIX D: EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS
In our experimental demonstration, the laser source is pro-
duced by a DFBdiode with a central wavelength of 1550.12 nm
and a pulse duration of 1 ns, operating at a repetition rate of 4
MHz. Alice sets μ = 0.5 and ν = 0.1 and randomly modulates
the signal and decoy states with uniform probabilities. Eve
performs the USD measurement for the signal and decoy states
randomly with equal probabilities as well.
The experiment results are collected over an operation time
of 748 s. The fluctuation of the attack performance through
time is shown in Fig. 4, where we can see that the results are
very stable.
In our experiment, the phases of signal pulses and decoy
pulses are both 0 because the phase reference of every pulse
is passed to Eve. In some other systems, the relative phase
between signal and decoy pulses may not be 0 (i.e., θs − θd =
0) and it can be shown that the success probability of USD is
maximized when the relative phase is π and minimized when
022308-6
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Experimental results over time for the USD attack demonstration. Note that ξμ (ξν) is close to 100%, which indicates
that we have a nearly perfect interferometer with a high visibility achieving 500:1.
it is 0, corresponding to 23.0% and 3.75%, respectively. With
a higher success probability, Eve is more capable of stealing
the final key and thus the upper bound of the key rate becomes
lower. Figure 3 shows the two upper bounds corresponding to
the two success probabilities.
APPENDIX E: REVIEW OF ONE-DECOY STATE
The key assumption in the security proof of decoy-state
QKD [15] is the equivalence between phase-randomized
coherent states and the photon number channel model. A WCS
can be described as a superposition of photon number (Fock)
states
|α〉 = |√μeiθ 〉 = e−|α|2/2
∞∑
n=0
αn√
n!
|n〉, (E1)
where μ and θ are the intensity and phase of the coherent
state, respectively. Since the eavesdropper has no knowledge
of phase θ , from her point of view, the density matrix of the
state should be written as [15]
ρμ =
∫ 2π
0
dθ
2π
|√μeiθ 〉〈√μeiθ | = e−μ
∞∑
n=0
μn
n!
|n〉〈n|. (E2)
As shown, the state is a Poisson distributed mixture of photon
number state |n〉. Then, the channel between Alice and Bob
can be understood as a photon number channel. Alice uses
channel n with a probability of e−μ μ
n
n! to send out an n-photon
state to carry the qubit information.
Based on the photon number channel model, we briefly
review the postprocessing for the one-decoy state protocol
[22]. The lower bound of the key rate when Alice and Bob are
unaware of Eve’s attack is given by
Rl = −QμH (Eμ) + Y1μe−μ[1 − H (e1)], (E3)
where Qμ and Eμ are the overall gain and QBER, and Y1 and
e1 are the yield and the error rate of the single-photon state,
which are estimated by the decoy states. From the analysis
using the one-decoy state protocol [22], one can derive the
lower bound of Y1 and upper bound of e1:
Y1 
μ
μν − ν2
(
Qνe
ν − Qμeμ ν
2
μ2
− EμQμeμ μ
2 − ν2
e0μ2
)
,
e1 
EμQμe
μ
Y
L,μ,0
1 μ
. (E4)
The gains, Qμ and Qν , are given in Eq. (C5). We model the
overall QBER in the normal quantum channel to be
EμQμ = e0Y0 + ed (1 − e−ημ), (E5)
where e0 = 1/2 is the error rate of the background count;
Y0 is the background count rate, which includes the detector
dark count and other background contributions; and ed is the
probability that a photon triggers the incorrect detector and is
due to the misalignment and instability of the optical system.
As we did not implement Bob’s system in our experiment, we
adopt some realistic parameters of a setup with superconduct-
ing single-photon detectors [31]: Y0 = 10−7, ed = 2.0%, and
a detection efficiency of 5%.
APPENDIX F: ERROR STATISTICS ANALYSIS
In this attack, we form the attack strategy as an optimization
problem subject to preserving the gain statistics without
maintaining the error statistics, since the attack induces only a
low error rate and is not noticeable by looking at the error rate
statistics. Here we analyze in detail the more rigorous results of
the key rate upper bound, when Eve strictly maintains the gain
statistics and the error statistics simultaneously. We can see
that even considering the error rate introduced by our attack
demonstration that Alice and Bob might check strictly, Eve
can still successfully steal the secure key in the same channel
loss regime.
To maintain the error statistics, Eve should satisfy the
equations
EμQμ = 12Y0 + ed (1 − e
−ημ)
= 1
2
Z
μ
0 +
∞∑
i=1
qμ
[

μ
i ξμZ
μ
i +
1
2
(1 − ξμ)Zνi
]
e−μ
μi
i!
,
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EνQν = 12Y0 + ed (1 − e
−ην)
= 1
2
Zν0 +
∞∑
i=1
qν
[
νi ξνZ
ν
i +
1
2
(1 − ξν)Zμi
]
e−ν
νi
i!
,
(F1)
where μ(ν)i is the error Eve sets when Alice sends a signal
(decoy) state and Eve gets the correct USD measurement
result, and Zμ(ν)0 is the dark count Eve sets when there is
no photon in the signal (decoy) state Alice sends. Note that
Eve simply sets the QBER error to be the upper bound 12 here,
when Eve gets the incorrect USD measurement results.
Similarly to Appendix C, the optimization problem of
minimizing the key rate upper bound can be stated as follows:
min
{Zμi ,Zνi }
Y s1 (F2)
subject to
Qμ = 1 − e−ημ =
∞∑
i=1
qμ
[
ξμZ
μ
i + (1 − ξμ)Zνi
]
e−μ
μi
i!
,
Qν = 1 − e−ην =
∞∑
i=1
qν
[
ξνZ
ν
i + (1 − ξν)Zμi
]
e−ν
νi
i!
,
EμQμ = 12Y0 + ed (1 − e
−ημ)

∞∑
i=1
1
2
qμ(1 − ξμ)Zνi e−μ
μi
i!
,
EνQν = 12Y0 + ed (1 − e
−ην) 
∞∑
i=1
1
2
qν(1 − ξν)Zμi e−ν
νi
i!
,
(F3)
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Bounds on the key generation rate. Our
attack is successful when the lower bound is higher than the upper
bound, which occurs when the transmission loss is between 36.3 and
48.1 dB (for our experiment).
where all Zμi and Zνi are in the regime [0,1]. In the gain
and error statistics equations, ξμ, ξν and qμ, qν are set as the
experimental results. For a given overall efficiency η between
Alice and Bob, we can calculate the key rate upper bound, as
shown in Fig. 5.
Theoretically, since the error rate of USD measurement is
0, the error statistics is easy to maintain or even optimize.
Therefore, the gap between the lower bound in Eq. (E3) and
the upper bound in Eq. (C6) will be the same as the one shown
in Fig. 3.
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